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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN T H E MATTER OF T H E
ESTATE AND GUARDIANS H I P OF JOAN OELERICH,
Incompetent.
H E L E N D. O E L E R I C H ,
Petitioner and Appellant, Case No.
10005

vs.
JOAN

OELERICH,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE
This is an appeal from an order in the guardianship
proceeding dismissing the petition for appointment of a
guardian of the estate and person of Joan Oelerich,
alleged to be incompetent.
D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT
The District Judge dismissed the petition of Helen
D. Oelerich, mother of Joan Oelerich, for appointment
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of Walker Bank & Trust Company as guardian on the
grounds that the petitioner had not been diligent in
proceeding with the action, and that a Trust Agreement
had been executed whereby the First National Bank of
Chicago had been appointed Trustee of certain property
received by Joan Oelerich from her father's estate. The
order was granted without a hearing on the merits of
the petition and without any determination of the incompetency of Joan Oelerich.
*

•

*

••

*

•

•

•

* * *

•

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks an order vacating and setting
aside the order of dismissal of the petition for appointment of guardian and requiring the District Court to
determine the issues of fact raised by such petition, and
upon such determination, that a guardian of the person
and property of Joan Oelerich be appointed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Most of the relevant facts pertinent to a consideration of the issues raised on appeal are contained in the
verified Petition for Appointment of Guardian (R. 5-6)
and the Affidavit of Helen D. Oelerich filed on or about
March 14, 1962 (R. 35-38).
The first four paragraphs of this Statement of
Facts are substantiated by these portions of the Record
on Appeal.
4
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The Petitioner, Helen D. Oelerich, is the mother
of the respondent, Joan Oelerich. Petitioner is a resident
of Cook County, Illinois. Joan was born February 1.7,
1938. At the age of 16, after having become pregnant
by one Burtis Bishop, she was married to Bishop on
November 27, 1954. A child was born to her on May 5,
1955. She was divorced from Bishop in 1955 at the age
of 17. In the latter part of 1956, respondent became
pregnant again by a person whose name was not known
to the mother. She was examined at that time by Dr.
Ernest M. Solomon, a licensed physician, and Dr. Jules
Gelperjn, a psychiatrist. Dr. Solon^on reported to the
Highland Park Hospital at Highland Park, Illinois
that Joan was suicidal, withdrawn, acutely depressed
and hard to contact. Dr. Gilperin reported to the same
committee that she was suicidal and pre-psychotic and
that unless an abortion was performed, either suicidal
or severe suicidal depression would occur. Upon their
recommendations an abortion was performed by Dr.
Solomon on August 14, 1956. Subsequently Joan was
referred by Dr. Solomon to Dr. Gilperin for psychotherapy. Dr. Solomon reported that she was not likely
to recover without such treatment. Joan received psychotherapy from Dr. Gilperin for a short period but
apparently abandoned her treatment.
During the last few days of September, 1959, Joan
met one George Holle in an elevator in a Chicago hotel.
Approximately a week later, on October 4, 1959, she
suddenly took her four-year-old child, left her mother's
home and went with Holle to Indiana where she lived
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with Holle's wife and his children. Soon after her arrival
in Indiana, Joan was induced by Holle to deliver to
him the sum of $10,000, which he used to repay a debt
owed by him. On March 9, 1962, when her affidavit was
filed, Joan's mother stated on information and belief
that no part of that money had ever been returned to
Joan.
On November 19, 1959, less than six weeks after
Joan's arrival in Indiana, her mother visited her and
Holle at Holle's home. At that time Holle assaulted
Joan's mother and knocked her unconscious. When she
recovered, Mrs. Oelerich saw her daughter, Joan, standing nearby, laughing hysterically and saying " I didn't
see a thing." On several subsequent occasions Joan told
various persons that she was "extremely confused and
unhappy and did not know what strange influence was
keeping her in Indiana." During Joan's stay in Indiana
she became pregnant by Holle. In or about October,
1960, Holle brought her to Salt Lake City. Holle was
a truck driver commuting between Salt Lake City and
Indiana. While he was in Salt Lake City he lived with
Joan and while he was in Indiana he lived with his lawful wife and children.
On or about March 16, 1961, the child of Joan and
Holle, then only a few weeks old, died, apparently from
suffocation or a respiratory ailment.
> On December 21, 1961, petitioner filed her "Petition for Appointment of Guardian" in the District
Court of Salt Lake County alleging that Joan was a
6
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resident of Salt Lake County, approximately 23 years
of age, and "is . . . by reason of her mental condition . .>
unable, unassisted, to properly manage and take care
of her property; and is likely to be deceived or imposed
upon by artful or designing persons . . . " The petition
alleged that Joan's mother had approximately $14,000
which belonged to respondent, and in addition, Joan
was going to receive a sum in excess of $250,000 as a
result of the probate of the estate of her father, Joseph
F . Oelerich. The petition alleged that " . . . it is necessary
and convenient that this court appoint a fit and suitable
person to be the guardian of her person and estate and
to properly care for, control and manage her person
and estate." Inasmuch as she had no immediate relatives
in the state of Utah, petitioner nominated Walker Bank
& Trust Company and alleged that it was willing to act
as the guardian of Joan's person and estate." (R, 5-6).
Joan appeared, through attorneys, and moved that
the petition be dismissed (R. 7). She also filed an answer
in which she admitted the fact that she was to receive
assets from her father's estate and denied most of the
other allegations of the petition (R. 7-10). The matter
was referred to the trial calendar on January 10, 1962.
Ray S. McCarty and his associates were the original
attorneys for the petitioner. They filed a notice to take
the deposition of Joan upon oral interrogatories in February, 1962, but it does not appear from the file that her
deposition was ever taken. In March, 1962, they filed a
motion for an order to compel Joan to submit to a
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mental examination (R. 25-26). On March 6, counsel
served upon the attorney for respondent a notice that
depositions would be taken of the keeper of records of
the Highland Park Hospital, Highland Park, Illinois,
in Chicago. A notice to take the depositions of Dr. Jules
Gilperin, Dr. Ernest M. Solomon and Dr. H . H .
Garner in Chicago was filed and apparently a motion
to vacate the notice was filed by the respondent. The
motion to vacate was denied by an order dated February
5, 1962 (R. 30). It appears from the records in the
District Court that these depositions were taken, but
they are not published and are not before the court in
the instant proceeding. There was a hearing on March
16, 1962 on petitioner's objections to certain requests
for admissions.
In a "Reply Affidavit" dated March 14,1962, Joan
denied many of the allegations of her mother's prior
affidavit. She denied that she was in need of psychiatric
treatment or examination and stated that she had
6
'divested herself of control of her property through the
creation of an irrevocable trust and she has appointed
the Honorable J . Bracken Lee of Salt Lake City, as
Trustee, and that he is now entitled to act as her Trustee,
on her behalf and in her stead, until removed by order
of the Court or otherwise."
-•/•:<. At that time Joan still claimed to be domiciled in
Indiana but that "she still resides in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah" (R. 57-58). In April, 1962, Joan filed,
through her attorneys, various motions, one of which
8
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was to continue the lawsuit without date and to "dismiss
the motions presently before the court in this matter"
and to approve the trust agreement with J . Bracken Lee
and its supplement, and "to require an annual accounting of the same before this Court under whose jurisdiction it shall remain unless otherwise ordered by the
Court." Joan's attorneys withdrew October 8,1962, and
Ray S. McCarty and H . G. Metos withdrew as attorneys for petitioner April 16, 1963. Merlin O. Baker,
an associate of the firm of Ray, Quinney and Nebeker,
appeared as counsel for petitioner on July 9, 1963. During the four or five months preceding August 26, 1963,
there were settlement negotiations between counsel for
the parties (R. 135). After approval by the attorneys,
the settlement proposal was rejected by Joan (R. 136).
No showing was made or prof erred by respondent that
a delay in the hearing was prejudicial to her in any
manner (R. 136). On June 28, 1963, present counsel
for Joan appeared and filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that "Petitioner has not been diligent
in proceeding with the action" and that the First National Bank of Chicago had been named trustee in an
agreement "which completely protects the property of
Joan Oelerich . . . from artful or designing persons"
(R. 74-75).
On June 28,1963, Virginia Kelly, a cousin of Joan,
executed an affidavit to the effect that she had lunch
with Joan in Chicago in February. (R. 86).
i
"During the course of said luncheon, Joan
Oelerich caused a scene by screaming 'They are
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•>*;.'
.

trying to call me a murderer,' referring to the
death of her illegitimate daughter, Dawn Holle,
in Utah. During the course of this luncheon, Joan
Oelerich repeatedly made irrational statements,
and her conduct and manner was such that it
appeared to affiant that, in the opinion of affiant,
Joan Oelerich was then mentally or emotionally
disturbed.
"4. Several years ago, before she moved to
Utah, Joan Oelerich received psychiatric treatment in Illinois.

;

"5. Affiant is informed and believes that since
moving
to Utah, Joan Oelerich has been cohabits
, ing illicitly with one George Holle, despite the
fact that her young daughter, Star Bishop, lives
in the same home."

The file does not reflect the present alleged marital
status of George Holle. At a hearing held in April,
1962, respondent's counsel referred to her as Miss
Oelerich and she gave her name as Joan Oelerich (R.
156), but upon cross-examination she admitted that the
bills she had presented into court were in the name of
George Holle and she used the names Joan Holle, Joan
Oelerich and Joan Oelerich Holle (R. 163).
There was no hearing on the merits of the petition
for letters of guardianship. The court made no determination as to whether the trust agreement between the
Chicago bank and respondent was subject to revocation
by agreement of the trustee and the beneficiaries. There
was no determination as to whether Joan had any assets
other than those allegedly delivered to the trustee. There
10
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was no determination as to whether Joan was competent
to determine her own needs for support, maintenance
or education which presumably may be satisfied by the
distributor of trust income.
And it is undisputed that there is nothing in the
trust instrument or otherwise in the record in this proceeding to indicate that there is any fiduciary acting for
Joan which would serve as a substitute for a guardian
of her person. The court made no effort to determine
whether a guardianship of her person was required
under the circumstances in this proceeding.

ARGUMENT
P O I N T I.
T H E COURT E R R E D I N D I S M I S S I N G
T H E P E T I T I O N ON T H E GROUNDS OF
F A I L U R E TO PROSECUTE W I T H D I L I GENCE.
This court said, in King Bros. Inc. v. Utah Dry
Kilne Co. (1962), 13 Ut(2d) 399, 374P(2d) 254:
"From the standpoint of the administration of
justice, it is wise and desirable to adhere to a
policy of being reluctant to turn a party out of
court without trial. I t can justifiably be done
only if the party could not in any event establish
a right to recover." Citing Morris v. Farnsworth
Motel (1953), 123 Ut. 289, 259 P . (2d) 297.
Sustaining the action of the trial court for refusing
to dismiss an action which had been on file for three
11
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years, this court held in Wright v. Howe, et al. (1915),
46 Ut. 588, 150 P . 956 that:
;
"This court, in a number of decisions, has
clearly indicated that it is the policy of the law to
have cases tried and determined upon the merits
whenever such a course is possible, and where it
does not clearly invade the rights of one of the
parties."
The court indicated that where failure to obtain a
hearing speedily was not prejudicial, and particularly
where the hearing might be held at the instance of the
movant, dismissal without a hearing was improper.
"Merely failing to prosecute an action is not
sufficient to show prejudice. This is especially
true where the defendant may himself press the
action to trial."
In Crystal Lime and Cement Co. v. Robbins
(1959), 8 Ut(2d) 389, 335 P . (2d) 624, this court held
that the dismissal of an action which had been pending
for eight years for failure to prosecute constituted an
abuse of discretion where there had been equal opportunity for both parties to keep it moving.
"Since any party to this action could have obtained the relief to which it was entitled at any
time it had wanted, but both parties chose to
dally a number of years, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant respondent's motion
to dismiss with prejudice."
In the instant case, the record reflects the fact that
any delay in a determination of the issues on their merits
12
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was prompted more by delaying tactics of the respondent than by lack of aggressiveness of the petitioner.
Petitioner took three depositions after respondent's
motion to vacate notice of their taking was denied (R.
14-15). The respondent filed two motions to dismiss the
petition, both of which were denied (R. 22). Respondent
resisted petitioner's motion for an order to compel the
alleged incompetent to submit to a mental examination.
The record reflects that on April 11, 1962, respondent
filed a motion for an order "to continue this lawsuit without date" (R. 69). I t appears that this motion and others
came on for hearing on April 17, 1962 and were taken
under advisement (R. 68). I t does not appear that any
further orders were made in the case until the end of
June, 1963, when new counsel for the respondent filed
a motion to dismiss upon the grounds of lack of diligence
and execution of the trust agreement (R. 74-75). In this
posture, who is to say which party failed to move with
reasonable diligence? The court had taken under advisement certain motions of the respondent. At the time the
respondent filed her motion, she had been negotiating
through her attorneys for four or five months with the
attorneys for the petitioner to work out a settlement
of the matter, and the record is that the settlement was
rejected by the respondent after it had been approved
by her attorneys (R. 135-136).
The net effect of the court order was to hold petitioner responsible for a continuance of the lawsuit without date upon respondent's motion. It is little wonder
that the respondent was able to demonstrate any privi-
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lege as a result of the court having taken her motion
for continuance under advisement.
I t is submitted that reasonable fairness required
that at the least, petitioner should have been given an
opportunity to take additional steps in preparation for
hearing or to prosecute the case in some other manner
before an order of dismissal was entered. The ruling
of the trial court constituted a flagrant abuse of discretion under Rule 41(b), and conflicts with the cases
cited by this court before and after the adoption of
the Rule.

P O I N T II.

T H E COURT E R R E D IN DISMISSING
T H E P E T I T I O N ON T H E GROUNDS T H A T
A TRUST AGREEMENT WAS E N T E R E D
INTO W I T H FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF
CHICAGO.
A. The court erred in failing to determine whether
the alleged trust agreement was a valid substitute for a
guardianship procedure insofar as the assets of the ward
are concerned.
Insofar as reference to the Trust Agreement was
concerned, it is not clear whether the court considered
the respondent's motion of June 28, 1963 as the equivalent of a motion for summary judgment or as a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In either event,
14
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the granting of the motion was in flagrant violation of
the Rule. The motion may be regarded as one for a
summary judgment in the light most favorable to the
respondent. If Rule 56 had been followed, petitioner
would have had an opportunity to submit affidavits or
to make any other appropriate showing essential to
justify her opposition. See Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, paragraphs (e) and (f). Petitioner would
have had an opportunity to take respondent's deposition.
The depositions of the three doctors taken in Chicago
could have been published. There could have been appropriate opportunity to explore the provisions of the
trust and the possibility of revocation by the trustee and
beneficiary without the consent of the petitioner or the
court. It should be noted in this respect that during the
spring of 1962, respondent's counsel represented to the
court that an irrevocable trust agreement had been
entered into between respondent and J . Bracken Lee,
yet this instrument must have been revoked by the
parties before the trust agreement with the Chicago
bank could have been effected. The record is silent upon
the disposition of the earlier trust instrument.
The trial judge ruled upon the respondent's motion
in the face of the holdings by this court that a summary
judgment ''which turns a party out of court without an
opportunity to present his evidence, is a harsh measure
that should be granted only when, taking the view most
favorable to the parties' claim and any proof that might
properly be adduced thereunder, he could in no event
prevail." Kidman v. White (1963), 14 Ut(2d) 142,
15
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378 P (2d) 898. To the same effect is Samms v. Eccles
(1961), 11 Ut(2d) 289, 358 P(2d) 344.
The trial court's assumption that the trust agreement ''completely protects the property of Joan Oelerich from artful or designing persons" is gratuitous and
and is unsupported by the record. Aside from the fact
that no hearing was held to make a determination of
such fact, it is apparent from the instrument itself that
the agreement is applicable only to the assets theretofore held by the conservator of Joan's father's estate
(R. 76-83). Petitioner alleged in her original petition
that there was at least $14,000 belonging to Joan which
was held outside of the estate (R. 5). There is nothing
in the record to indicate that Joan does not own other
assets or that she will not acquire other assets during the
ten-year term of the trust, either from her mother or gift
from any other person, or otherwise. Is it unreasonable
to suppose that Joan is not now or will not become, in
the next ten years, the beneficiary of gifts from her
mother or from other persons? In view of the means
within the family, is it not likely that Joan's mother
or other persons may desire to make direct gifts to her in
view of possible savings in inheritance taxes, estate taxes
and other applicable consideration of modern day estate
planning? Moreover, is the court to engage in the presumption in these circumstances without any support
in the record that Joan may not have or acquire property
of her own independent of any activities of other members of the Oelerich family? Is the trust vested? If the
trust is vested, what is to prevent the beneficiary from
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conveying her interest? It is true that article 4 contains
some restrictive agreements with respect to alienation.
It is submitted, however, that the ruling of the court
below precludes any inquiry as to the application of
these provisions to factual possibilities which may exist
during the term of the trust.
The point is that the ruling of the trial court negated
any opportunity for exploration of the relevant facts
and circumstances involved. There was no occasion
afforded to present any evidence, either by way of affidavit of examination of witnesses, or otherwise. It is
submitted that Judge Hanson's ruling was in direct
opposition to the admonition of this court in Samms v.
Eccles, supra, to the effect that the partie's ''contentions
must be considered in the light most to her advantage
and all doubts resolved in favor of permitting her to go
to trial; and only if the whole matter is so viewed, she
could, nevertheless establish no right of recovery, should
the motion be granted."
B. Even assuming the trust instrument adequately
safeguarded the property during the term of the trust,
it was inadequate in failing to supply the needs of a
guardian for the person of the respondent.
Our statutes contemplate different powers and
responsibilities for guardians of persons and property.
Duties of guardians of persons are described in 75-1331, U C A 1953, and 75-13-32, describes the duties of
guardians of property. A case recognizing typical differences between the duties of guardians for these dif17
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ferent problems is recognized in OJHare's Guardianship
(1959), 9 Ut(2d) 181, 341 P ( 2 d ) 205. I t is submitted
that in this connection there is no relevant difference in
the guardianship of children and adults; no difference
in the status or powers of guardianship of children and
adults is made by the statute in this respect, cf. In Re
Adoption of Frasch (1949), 165 Pa. Sup. 75, 67 Atl
(2d) 830.
Substantially in point is the case of State ex rel. v.
Standefer (Mo. App. 1959), 328 SW(2d) 739 where a
petition was filed for the appointment of a guardian of
the person and estate of Standefer. Standefer was an
adult charged with a felony in the magistrate's court.
The probate judge dismissed the petition. The Appellate
Court reversed and held that while the probate judge
under these circumstances had no authority to conduct
a hearing with respect to the appointment of a guardian
because of the criminal jurisdiction of the magistrate's
court over Standefer's person, it was error to refuse
to hold a hearing with respect to the appointment of a
guardian of the property. The Appellate court noted
that the Missouri statute contemplated guardians of
persons and property with two distinct characteristics.
"We are of the opinion that the judge of the
probate court had not only the power but also the
duty to inquire into (only) whether Standefer
was so incompetent as to require the appointment
of a guardian over his estate to the end that his
property might be gathered and preserved."
The instant petition prayed for letters of general guar-
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dianship under Section 75-13-29. Thus the issue was
presented as to whether a guardian should be appointed
for the person as well as the property of Joan.
It is submitted that the trial court could not reasonably have determined as a matter of law on the basis of
the present record that Joan was not incompetent within
the meaning of 75-13-20 U C A 1953 as amended. I t
certainly appears obvious on the other hand that there
was a considerable amount of evidence already in the
file to indicate that she was unable "unassisted, to properly manage and take care of [her] self . . . and by reason
thereof would likely be deceived or imposed upon by
artful or designing persons." The file indicates that at
the age of 23 she had become pregnant three times without having been married at the time of intercourse when
the children were conceived. (R. 35-36). Three Illinois
doctors presumably have diagnosed and treated Joan
for mental or emotional illness or instability. (R. 35-36).
She was characterized by one of these doctors as being
"suicidal, withdrawn, accutely depressed and hard to
contact." (R. 35). A licensed Illinois psychiatrist stated
that in his opinion she was "suicidal and pre-psychotic."
These doctors stated that she was unlikely to become well
without psycho-therapy. While she received psychotherapy treatment for a short period of time, she soon
abandoned it. When her mother was knocked unconscious by George Holle, by whom Joan became pregnant, Joan stood nearby "laughing hysterically and saying 'I didn't see a thing.' " (R. 36). Her mother believed
that she was mentally ill and in need of mental care and
19
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treatment, and "she is unable, unassisted, to properly
manage and take care of herself or her property, that by
reason thereof, she is likely to be deceived and imposed
upon by artful or designing persons, and has been so
imposed upon by George Holle."
The facts adduced at a hearing on one of respondent's motions held April 17, 1962, point toward the
need of a guardian. Respondent admitted that all the
expenses which she was claiming were represented by
bills sent to George Holle. (R. 161). Holle received
a bill from the Manhattan Club. H e received the light
and gas bill; the bill from the landlord, and for groceries. (R. 161-162). Holle had arranged that Joan borrow $1500 from the bank of Iron County about two
months previously. (R. 162-163). Joan substantially
admitted that she was unable to cope with her problems
with the following explanation: "The problem is, have
you ever been a woman alone, trying to sign a lease for
a house or trying to get some sort of credit." (R. 162).
In June, 1963 Joan had lunch with a cousin in a
fashionable restaurant in Chicago. During the course of
the luncheon Joan became hysterical and began screaming: "They are trying to call me a murderer," referring
to the death of her illegitimate daughter by George
Holle, born in Utah. She made irrational statements
and it appeared to her cousin that she was emotionally
and mentally disturbed. She has been living and cohabiting illicitly with George Holle since moving to Utah,
despite the fact that her young daughter, Star, lives in
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the same home. (R. 86). It is submitted that the credibility of the court would be taxed by an assertion that
the relationship between Holle and Joan Oelerich does
not, under the circumstances, amount to an imposition
upon Joan. The fact that Joan is presently heiress to a
quarter of a million dollars and prospective heiress of at
least another quarter million cannot be ignored. It is
suggested that if the law enforcement agencies of Salt
Lake County turn their heads at such circumstances,
that the steady eyes of a court of law should not fail to
penetrate them. The applicable statutes impose upon the
judiciary a duty to determine the relevant facts in the
circumstances herein presented.
Neither the provisions of the trust agreement nor
the circumstances in which it was executed provide any
mechanics for the safeguard of the person of Joan Oelerich. The trustee bank is in Chicago. According to the
present record, although having lived in Utah for approximately three years, Joan claims to be a resident
of Indiana. The petition here alleges that Joan resides
in Salt Lake County. (R. 5). No provisions of the trust
pretend to authorize the trustee to take care of Joan.
I t has, in fact, never been contended by respondent's
counsel that the trust instrument was an effective substitute for a guardian of her person if in fact one was
required. It is submitted that even if the trust is a valid
substitute for a claim insofar as Joan's assets are concerned, it is totally and completely inadequate to supply
the needs of a guardian for her person.
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POINT III.
P E T I T I O N E R I S E N T I T L E D TO A N
ADJUDICATION OF T H E ISSUES IN H E R
P E T I T I O N ON I T S M E R I T S . F A I L U R E TO
ADJUDICATE
SUCH
ISSUES
DENIES
P E T I T I O N E R DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
I t is suggested that the circumstances of the respondent's motion, the granting of which is the subject of
this appeal, in effect deprives the petitioner of due
process of law. I t is not suggested here that Rule 56,
when followed, deprives a party of due process. That
question has long since been decided. The principles of
summary judgment have been approved when they
apply to a situation where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice,
pp. 2037-2042, and see General Investment Co. v. Inter
Borough Rapid Transit Co. (1923), 235 N.Y. 133, 139
N . E . 216; Lindsey v. Leavy (CCA 9,1945), 149 F (2d)
899, cert. den. (1946) 326 U.S. 783, 90 L.Ed. 474,
66S.Ct.-331.In the instant case, however, Rule 56 was not followed. Petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to
even define the issues of fact, let alone presenting evidence upon them by affidavit or other appropriate procedure. Although denying defendant's motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it failed to constitute a claim for relief—a ruling, parenthetically, which
was obviously correct—the probate court arbitrarily
determined without a hearing that the petition should
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be denied. None of the recognized procedural safeguards
were followed. No testimony was taken. Even the depositions on file were totally ignored. It is submitted that
these circumstances constitute a denial of the right of a
litigant to be heard. If such a ruling was permitted to
stand, it would constitute a denial of due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah. In Jensen v. Union
Pacific R.R. Co. (1889), 6 Ut. 253, 21 P . 994, this court
held that due process of law means:
". . .that a party shall have his day in court, —
trial; which means the right of each party, plaintiff and defendant, to introduce evidence to establish his defense upon the part of the other; after
which comes judgment. Any judgment which is
rendered without these modes of procedure, or
in disregard of them, is not 'due process of law.'
Any other procedure condemns before it hears,
does not proceed upon inquiry, but renders judgment before trial."
See also Christiansen v. Harris (1945), 109 Ut. 1, 163
P(2d) 314.

SUMMARY AND

CONCLUSION

The ruling of the trial court in dismissing the petition under the circumstances of this proceeding constituted the denial of a reasonable opportunity for a hearing on the merits. The petition was granted without
compliance with Rule 56 and without any determination
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of the issues of fact, notwithstanding the ruling of the
trial judge that the petition stated a claim for relief.
The grounds given by the trial court in the order of
dismissal are without any merit or validity. The order
of dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded
for appropriate additional proceedings.
Respectfully submitted, this 2nd day of March,
1964.
G E O R G E M.

McMILLAN

1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney

for Petitioner
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